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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the stereotyped media image of Sunderland as 
‘Brexit City’, the epitome of the crisis in working-class voting,  By 
contrast, local voting patterns suggests that the city was typical of Labour 
heartlands. It is argued that factors such as education and class may 
have been more important, factors that were reflected nationally as well 
as locally in the North East. More broadly, the crisis of English, white, 
identity in the former industrial heartlands is conceptually and historically 
explored to place Sunderland in its unique local context.  
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Introduction 
The result of the UK 2016 Referendum on European Union membership, a 
narrow victory for the ‘Leave’ campaign or Brexit, came as a shock to 
most media commentators. To those who had made a study of the 
changing sense of identity and political loyalties of many working-class 
voters, the result fitted a pattern going back several decades. An 
intersection of several processes has been identified in recent work, such 
as de-industrialisation, loss of secure well-paid work, a sense of isolation 
from metropolitan cultural trends, a heightened anxiety about 
immigration, and, most recently, the growth of a specifically English 
national identity. These have all been subject to critical scrutiny and 
debate among social scientists. The purpose here is to apply some of 
these insights to the situation in Sunderland, and the approach resembles 
what has been called the ‘third wave’ of whiteness studies, attempting to 
scrutinise ‘localised whiteness as it intersects with class, nation and 
gender’ (Garner, 2009: 789). The strength of local feelings about recent 
social change, however, requires more emphasis on an historical 
exploration of the locality over the last two generations. 
 
Media Impressions 
In the early hours of 24 June 2016, a few minutes after it was reported 
that Newcastle upon Tyne had voted ‘Remain’ by a narrow margin, the 
news came in that Sunderland, a safe Labour city, had voted 
overwhelmingly to leave the European Union. The shock ran through the 
TV commentators prepared for a long night. This result is still seen as the 
most significant result during a fraught night for Labour after the 
Referendum.  The vote was 61:39 for leaving, on a 65% turnout. From 
the 134,400 votes cast, Leave received 82,394 and Remain polled 
51,930. (Referendum Results, 2016). Sunderland established itself as 
Brexit city. What I hope to show here is that, while Sunderland was the 
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first, it was by no means the worst, when it comes to ‘traditional’ labour 
voters going for Brexit. 
 
The Referendum result, which Sunderland’s votes epitomised, was 
commonly characterised as a major crisis for the Labour Party’s 
relationship with its core supporters, the traditional, largely white, 
working class. This was despite the fact that it led immediately to the 
downfall of Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron: yet attention was 
diverted towards analysis of Labour’s ‘crisis’. ‘Labour is facing an 
extraordinary meltdown in its traditional heartlands as working-class 
areas voted 'Leave' in their droves’ said the Daily Mirror the day after, 
next to a large picture of the ‘Leave’ campaigners celebrating in 
Sunderland (Glaze and Blanchard, 2016). The party’s leadership had 
allegedly lost touch with popular anxieties about immigration and the 
European Union, and the official policy of qualified, rather unenthusiastic, 
support for ‘Remain’ was seen by many commentators as an indication of 
that general crisis. The New York Times went further, claiming that the 
‘Pro-Brexit City’ was ‘glad to poke the establishment in the eye’, and the 
story was accompanied by somewhat stereotyped photographs of flag-
strewn terraced houses in Washington, a ‘run-down neighbourhood close 
to the Nissan plant’. Local people resented both London and Brussels, the 
reporter claimed, and felt excluded from the new developments paid for 
by the European Union such as the new Aquatic Centre and the ‘sleek 
modern’ university, both of which seemed impossibly expensive (De 
Freytas-Tamurajune, 2016). This report led the Sunderland Echo to 
encourage people to respond vigorously to the misrepresentation of the 
city. 
 
Facts and Figures 
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Contrary to the media interpretations, the 2016 votes for ‘Leave’ in 
Sunderland, 82,394, may have been largely made up of supporters of 
traditional Eurosceptic parties. If all those who voted Conservative and 
UKIP in 2015 voted ‘out’, then at least 47,000 in the Referendum could 
have been Tory and UKIP voters, and were certainly unlikely to have been 
Labour. The proportion of voters for UKIP in the election exceeded that of 
the Conservatives, ranging from 10.6% (Washington and West 
Sunderland) to 13.4% (Sunderland Central) (See Table 1). If the UKIP 
supporters can confidently be characterised as ‘Brexit’ voters, the 
Conservatives are harder to interpret. It seems likely that the local 
Conservatives are different from the middle-class ‘remainers’ of the more 
affluent South. Between the two, therefore, these could account for 58% 
of the ‘Brexiters’.  
 
There are other factors, too, unique to the Referendum: the most 
significant and little noticed feature was the increased turnout of voters in 
many areas, particularly when compared with the 2015 general election 
(See Table 1). Some districts also experienced an increase in registered 
voters in the months before the Referendum, though this was not the 
case in Sunderland, where the electorate, at just over 200,000, seems to 
have been stable, declining slightly in fact compared with recent years.  
The turnout in the Referendum, however was, at 65%, far more than the 
55-57% the three constituencies1 had shown in the parliamentary 
elections of the previous year (see Table 1). The issue of membership of 
the European Union seems to have galvanised a much larger proportion of 
voters to take part than had the more mundane affair of parliamentary 
elections: nationally there was about a 72% turnout. These extra voters 
seem more likely to have been recently-mobilised Brexiters than 
suddenly-alarmed remainers. It therefore seems probable, though it is 
                                                          
1  Washington and West Sunderland, Sunderland Central, and Houghton-le-Spring and 
Sunderland South. 
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difficult to prove, that part of the Brexit vote came from ‘traditional’ non-
voters, though whether they were former voters for Labour or any other 
party much earlier in their careers is impossible to say.  If these all voted 
‘out’, then another 8-10% of the Sunderland voters who opted for ‘Brexit’ 
– perhaps between 16,000 and 20,000 – came from this category of the 
previously inactive. 
 
Table 1: Voting Patterns by Constituency in 2015 General Election 
 WASHINGTON 
AND WEST 
SUNDERLAND 
SUNDERLAND 
CENTRAL 
HOUGHTON LE 
SPRING AND 
SUNDERLAND 
SOUTH 
TORY 7,033 7,997 7,105 
UKIP 7,321 9,780 8,280 
Joint total = 14,354 17,777 15,385 
Labour Vote = 20,1408 20,959 212,218 
Liberal Democrats 993 1105 791 
Green Party 1091 
 
1706 1095 
  Overall total Conservative and UKIP = 47516 Labour = 62,585 
 
 
On this calculation, therefore, with all the caveats and necessary 
expressions of caution, we can say that of the 82,000 or more who voted 
‘Brexit’, between 63,000 and 67,000 were probably not Labour voters. 
That, however, still leaves a substantial minority who almost certainly 
were. At least 16,000 ‘leave’ voters must have been Labour – which is 
more than a quarter of the 2015 Labour voters, and could have been 
closer to a third of the 62,000 or so who had voted for Labour candidates 
in 2015. This is not far off the national average: estimates vary, but it 
was calculated that about two thirds of Labour voters supported ‘remain’, 
compared with more than 70% of Liberal Democrats, the most 
enthusiastic pro-EU party in England. The two initial surveys, by the 
Ashcroft organisation suggested 63% of Labour voters chose ‘remain’, 
7 
 
while YouGov indicated 65%( see Polling Surveys, 2017). Nationally, only 
42% of Conservative voters did so – a clear measure of David Cameron’s 
failure to persuade his own party. That contrast, which might perhaps 
surprise many, is a measure of Jeremy Corbyn’s success in 2016. On that 
basis, Sunderland should have seen 20,000 Labour vote for ‘out’ - which 
is in line with the estimated calculations produced in this paper. Allowing 
for margins of error, it is unlikely that Sunderland was unusual in any 
significant way, or that it deviated very much from the national picture of 
Labour voting. ‘Sunderland about average’, however, would scarcely have 
made a startling headline (Curtice, 2016a and 2016b). 
 
Education and Cosmopolitanism 
This does not necessarily mean that Sunderland lacks distinctive 
characteristics which may have shaped the voting pattern in the 
Referendum. The city has had an unusual social and political history in 
several ways that may have been significant. Cosmopolitanism, 
educational level, and local community diversity all seem to have been 
key factors in influencing voting patterns in 2016. Sunderland has a small 
proportion of graduates in its population, and is relatively white – in fact, 
with one of the smallest proportion of British ethnic minorities and 
recently-arrived migrants anywhere in the North. If we look at the 
proportion of white, British-born residents, then Sunderland, at 94.8% in 
the 2011 census, is as ‘British’ as Cheshire (in fact slightly more so than 
the eastern part of that county) (Census 2011). Newcastle, at 81.9%, and 
Middlesbrough at 86.1%, are far more diverse, with greater numbers of 
migrants both white, black and Asian, as well as many more British-born 
ethnic minorities. Hartlepool, one of the most passionately ‘Brexit’ places 
in the North East, is almost the most white British-born of all, at 96.6%, 
above the regional average. Yet the most diverse city, Newcastle, voted 
‘remain’, while Teesside, with very similar levels of diversity, voted 
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‘Brexit’ (see Census, 2011). Sunderland, in fact, has had a long history of 
immigration going back to the nineteenth century, something that was, 
until recently, reflected in the range of religious denominations in the city. 
German Lutherans were once common, and Sunderland still has one of 
the largest Mormon churches in the North (Religious Worship, 1853: 
cclxix). The 100-year old Jewish community, originally from the Baltic, 
has dispersed recently, and the growing Muslim community has developed 
only over the last thirty years. There may be a cosmopolitan element in 
the population, particularly with the development of the university’s 
international links, but it is probably very limited compared with that in 
other diverse urban areas such as London.  
 
Another factor in the general pattern of voting, was age and levels of 
education. Richmond upon Thames, where about half of adults have 
higher education experience, was always going to vote for the EU 
(Guardian, 2016; Evening Standard, 2016). Sunderland has its successful 
young people, now progressing in larger numbers than ever before to 
higher education institutions. Despite this, the proportion of people with 
first-level university qualifications or above is less than a fifth (18%): by 
contrast, Newcastle’s, at 27%, is precisely the average for England and 
Wales (2011 Census). Sunderland’s older residents, though, while proud 
of their youngsters, have had little experience of post-18 education, even 
if many are highly skilled in the once-traditional industrial trades. In 
several of the poorest districts the proportion with any higher education 
(university level or equivalent) experience is below a tenth. It is possible 
to see a widespread generational and educational gulf both in Sunderland 
and elsewhere (Curtice, 2016a and b). Instead of seeing the whole 
population as post-industrial ‘left-behinds’, it has to be recognised that 
the veterans of now-vanished industries in particular areas voted in ways 
that were more nostalgic and resentful than the younger voters whose 
educational prospects have decisively improved in the twenty-first 
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century. This is also the national picture: Brexit was overwhelmingly 
supported by those aged 65 or more. This is not to say that Sunderland’s 
younger generation have chances equal to those of the South: as the 
Social Mobility Commission reports have demonstrated, the North, and 
particularly the North-East, has not generated the numbers of 
professional-level graduate job opportunities that are seen in the South, 
notably in London and the South-East. The younger generation, too, face 
regional disappointments (Social Mobility Commission, 2016). One 
consequence of the failure to develop the professional salaried 
employment sector, common to a number of northern cities, is that wage 
inequalities are comparatively low in Sunderland – it is a more egalitarian 
city than most (Lee et al., 2016: 1718).  
 
One factor in the voting pattern of young people, generally neglected by 
commentators, was gender: among those under 25, far more women 
voted for the EU (80%) than men (60%). Women were also slightly more 
favourable to EU memberships in other age groups, only falling below the 
men’s level of support among the oldest group. This has attracted little 
attention, even in academic research, but it might be that much of the 
language of memory and resentment discussed below is largely male. The 
sociology of ‘white’ identity has also been rather vague on gender 
differences (Statista, 2016). 
 
Sunderland, History and the Industrial Heritage 
Sunderland is distinctive, however, in having had a longstanding pattern 
on right wing voting, particularly in the inner city wards, shown in 
previous years by the strength of the British National Party which at times 
gained 15% of the votes cast in local elections (Teale, 2002-17; Saeed, 
2007). The BNP seems to have been replaced in many people’s affections 
by UKIP which, has less baggage as an extreme-right party, and its 
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broader appeal is reflected in its votes which matched those of the 
Conservatives in Sunderland in 2015. This is not untypical of many parts 
of the North in general, as Kirsty Major pointed out in the The 
Independent, on 24 June 2016, the day after the Referendum. The North-
South divide in the Referendum reflected some deep-rooted political 
loyalties in terms of the politics of immigration. There are also additional 
powerful elements of emotional loyalty to the past in Sunderland, 
particularly to the history of the armed forces, whose flags are sometimes 
flown from backgarden flagpoles. The Remembrance Day celebrations are 
reportedly among the largest outside London, and the sense of pride in 
the past merges with the memories of local contributions to national 
history such as through the coal and shipbuilding industries (BBC, 2011). 
It would be an exaggeration to regard Sunderland’s Brexiters as fascists-
lite: what the Referendum seems to have achieved is a broader coalition 
of a particular English, white working-class set of feelings and local pride 
behind ‘Leave’.  
 
Local Pride and Memory 
Memories and ‘traditions’, both national and local, are rarely very ancient: 
ever since historians began to examine the ‘invention of tradition’, there 
has been academic scepticism and debate about the political, official, 
manipulation of memories (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Nevertheless, 
the sense of living among the physical remains and social consequences 
of a unique local history shapes identities in many places for many 
people. Yet, generally, what Patrick Wright called ‘living in an old country’ 
is not simple (Wright, 1985). In 2007 there were many efforts to address 
Britain’s dominance of the slave trade, in the bicentenary of its abolition, 
but this was more than just commemoration: it necessarily involved 
acknowledgement of responsibility. The centenary of World War I 
provokes similar dilemmas, of recognising the courage and sacrifices 
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certainly, but also of questioning the way they were required by the 
generals and commanders. 
Economic change, the death and replacement of old industries, and the 
memories of their history, also pose these dilemmas. Memories and local 
pride centre on the loss of shipyards and mines rather than the re-
invention of Sunderland and Washington as the place of one of Nissan’s 
most productive car plants. History and ‘memory’ are locally constructed 
in areas that have been through both de-industrialisation and re-
industrialisation. Sunderland’s memories are entirely about men’s work, 
and many academic studies of deindustrialisation have concentrated on 
male sectors such as coal, steel and railways, with a few exceptions such 
as Walkerdine and Jimenez: although even they took women in a former 
coal and steel area as their focus. Only Jane Wheelock, working in the 
North East, considered the changing domestic and personal implications 
of the simultaneous changes in men’s and women’s work (Strangleman et 
al., 2014; Walkerdine and Jimenez, 2012; Wheelock, 1990). By contrast, 
in West Yorkshire and Lancashire, where the textile industry engaged 
women from the late eighteenth century onwards, the now-empty mills 
still dominating the landscape mark the end of skilled, industrial work for 
generations of women. More broadly, there is some evidence that 
deindustrialisation generally reduces the proportion of women in 
manufacturing, a form of ‘defeminisation’ that has attracted little 
attention (Tejani and  Milberg, 2010). In different localities, therefore, 
what Walkerdine has called the ‘affective landscapes’, that is, the 
emotional meanings of places of work, are very different depending on 
the gender division of labour and involvement in industrial work. Men and 
women may attach different memories to buildings and places in their 
towns and regions (Walkerdine, 2016). What has been called, rather 
brutally, ‘smokestack nostalgia’ for past industries, varies both by region 
and gender (Strangleman, 2013 and 2017). 
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The new forms of work have employed women on a large scale, 
unprecedented in the North East if not elsewhere in the North. By the 
early twenty-first century it was calculated that there were 50,000 jobs in 
the North East’s call centres Along with the retail sector, public services 
and growing financial services, many jobs for women, sometimes openly 
despised as such, were created (Tomaney, 2006:10). The numbers of 
jobs in services and finance doubled in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. By 2009 reports were calling Sunderland’s job creation a 
renaissance, even though the overall population had declined (Cooper, 
2009:3-5).  The 2011 census, however, suggests that, with 14,000 
manufacturing jobs in Sunderland (about 12% of total employment), and 
rising numbers of those involved in construction, the city was still more 
classically industrial than elsewhere (Census, 2011; Singer, 2007). 
 
The English Factor 
The rise of a specifically English sense of nationalism was one of the 
features of the 2015 election: David Cameron had played the nationalist 
card with his fear-inducing assertion that if people did not vote for him, 
the (Labour) Scots would be coming, like the old Border Reivers - with 
Labour help – perhaps (Milne, 2015). Similarly, UKIP had most of its 
strongholds in England, though one surprise was the strength of the 
‘Brexit’ vote in parts of de-industrialised South Wales. This sense of 
Englishness was almost certainly a factor in Sunderland’s sense of 
resentment against Brussels – and in some ways, against London. The 
two are not incompatible: the sense of marginalisation produced general 
resentment, even if the result of the vote would actually strengthen 
London’s power. Both the New York Times and, after a period of reflection 
six months after the vote, the Guardian’s northern correspondent, came 
to a conclusion that anti-London sentiment played a major part in the way 
people voted (Helen Pidd, 2016; De Freytas-Tamurajune, 2016). 
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There is certainly some evidence of the rise of a strong feeling of 
‘Englishness’ in the early twenty-first century, but this is largely a pattern 
among whites. In fact, there are distinctly different patterns of 
identification when the British white majority are compared with members 
of ethnic minorities: while white people have increasingly placed their 
‘local’ national identity first, particularly Welsh, Scottish and Northern 
Irish identities, the ethnic minorities overwhelmingly identify as British. 
Moreover, this British identity becomes stronger in the second generation, 
despite a parallel sense of belonging to a group with a particular national 
and religious background. Dual identities are common among black and 
ethnic minority groups, in other words. As one significant piece of 
research concluded, 
Overall then we see that dual identities are the ‘typical’ 
acculturation pattern for the UK’s ethnic minorities. Holding a 
strong British identity increases over generations as the 
tendency to have a strong minority identity reduces. We also see 
that those who appear to be most a risk of marginalization, in 
these terms of identity acculturation – with the greatest 
proportion maintaining neither strong minority nor strong 
majority identities, are the Caribbean group – a group which is 
recognised as being socially, geographically and in employment 
terms the most ‘assimilated’ . . ., but which may, in line with 
other findings, contain a section that feels alienated by a society 
that is still strongly stratified along racial and ethnic lines ’ 
(Nandi and Platt, 2013: 34). 
From this, we could conclude that one of our oldest ethnically distinct 
groups, African-Caribbeans, remain the most alienated from Britishness, 
particularly among the young. This has been reflected in repeated anti-
police protests and the 2011 rioting. More generally, it seems that, while 
white people have felt increasingly as members of one of the constituent 
founding nations of Britain, young people in the ethnic minorities have 
developed a growing sense of Britishness.  
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The rise of ‘Englishness’ was documented by one significant piece of 
research before the 2015 election and the Referendum. In 2011 and 2014 
data produced by the The Future of England Survey (ironically, run by 
universities in Wales and Scotland) demonstrated a major shift in English 
identification. Whereas once, the English were equally likely to identify as 
British or English, by 2014 this had been transformed into an 
overwhelmingly English identity. This is a predominantly white reaction to 
the changes since the late twentieth century. The research highlighted a 
pattern of resentment against both the European Union and what was 
seen as the favourable settlement of Scottish devolution: the researchers 
designated this as ‘devo-anxiety’. While in 2011 there were signs that a 
demand for equal treatment for England had some support, by 2014 the 
resentment had hardened into a generalised opposition to Europe and 
Scotland: both of England’s unions, the UK and the EU, were resented. 
‘Feeling English in England appears to harden attitudes towards England’s 
two “others”: Scotland, and its perceived advantages within the UK; and 
the EU’ (Henderson et al., 2014: 15). In a prophetic prediction, the study, 
significantly called ‘Taking England Seriously’, warned of the political 
consequences for Labour and the Liberal Democrats of campaigns that 
played on English resentments (Henderson et al, 2014: 33-4; Curtice, 
2016c). Garner has described the feelings brought together under a focus 
on immigration as less ones of class than a sense of loss of the traditional 
‘entitlement’ to place in British society (Garner, 2010: 1-3).  
 
Immigration and Social Change 
It seems that a combination of strong feelings of local loss, of English 
identity, and political opposition to immigration led to English rejection of 
the EU outside London and a few other cities. The Brexit slogan ‘Let’s 
Take Back Control’ clearly resonated in ways that echoed both the earlier 
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anti-immigration politics directed against Commonwealth migrants and 
the longstanding sense of grievance concerning loss of sovereignty to 
Brussels. The result was that the politics of immigration, now directed 
largely against white, European migrants, dominated the Referendum 
campaign. A basic premise of this derived from a long-held belief among 
many right wing commentators that immigration at high levels 
undermines both social solidarity and national identity: as Enoch Powell 
had remarked, ‘it is all a matter of numbers’, versions of which were 
echoed in the criticisms protesting not opposition to immigration as such, 
but to its supposedly unsustainable levels. ‘The Leave majority does 
amount to a public vote of no confidence in how governments have 
handled immigration over the last decade’: yet most voters interviewed 
agreed that the whole issue had become overheated in the campaigns 
(Katwala et al., 2016: 4 and 7).  
There is a large academic literature debating the effects of immigration on 
the host society, focussing largely on whether a multicultural society can 
achieve social cohesion, and in effect, integration of minorities, without 
enforcing or encouraging levels of assimilation to core values (see 
Antonsich, 2015; Casey, 2016; Biggar, 2014; and Collier, 2013). The 
politicisation of the issue makes any academic intervention almost 
impossible, but it is worth briefly summarising what is known. If the data 
discussed above suggest that Britain’s ethnic minorities identify as British, 
and this is increasingly so with the second generation (with the exception 
of young Afro-Caribbeans), studies suggest that there is an equivalent 
and parallel acceptance of diversity among young whites. In general, 
surveys suggest that there is a strong sense of internationalism among 
many people, particularly the young in Britain (Cantle, 2015: 471-2). 
Among the young in the most diverse city in Britain, London, there has 
developed a strong sense of social cohesion and community. Clearly, 
social cohesion has not been undermined by cultural diversity where 
frequent contact with many different people has led to an ease with these 
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differences and a sense of common interests. Moreover, among the 
young, ‘both white and non-white, neighbourhood ethnic diversity is 
positively associated with social cohesion’. Only among older, white, 
people, this is not the case (Sturgess et al, 2014:1300-2 and 1304).  
Yet immigration became a concern even in areas like Sunderland and 
Hartlepool where it has been relatively low. This is difficult to account for 
except as a general sentiment established through media representation 
rather than direct experience. The situation is fraught with contradictions: 
as one journalist has commented,  
Polling shows that most people have a negative opinion of 
immigration, despite them not having any negative experience 
of it. In fact, people in areas with most immigrants are least 
likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment (Seymour, 2014, 
unpaginated). 
Despite the evidence (above) that positive contact produces favourable 
attitudes, there were widespread expressions of the sentiment that 
immigration had been permitted to go too far. This produced difficulties 
for the Labour Party in particular, because they had been in power in the 
early 2000s when EU migration was opened up. More importantly, 
politically, is the accusation that it was ‘Labour’s decision to abandon our 
borders and encourage mass immigration from all over the world’ that 
had transformed neighbourhoods to the point where longstanding 
residents, even members of “settled” immigrant communities, feel 
threatened. They become strangers in the place they grew up’ (Richard 
Littlejohn, The Daily Mail, 28/7/06, quoted in Hickman et al. 2012: 24). 
This sense of embattlement in their own areas had been detected by 
researchers revisiting the site of one of the classic 1950s community 
studies. The ‘new East End’ did not feel like theirs, reported many, 
longstanding largely white, older locals (Geoff Dench et al., 2006, 
criticised by Moore, 2008).  
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Politically, then, immigration had acquired a negative image in the early 
2000s. Diversity is a social fact, as is multiculturalism, but ‘the British 
political class has never done a good job at explaining what the point of 
large-scale immigration was and whose interests it was meant to serve. 
That is partly because those questions are hard to answer’ (Goodhart, 
2013; 161). Britain’s NHS has been one organisation that has continually 
recruited abroad to maintain the numbers of doctors and nurses, yet the 
broader benefits of immigration have rarely been discussed, As Collier 
remarks, ‘migration has been politicized before it has been analyzed’ 
(Collier, 2013: 110-2). The belief that the welfare state and education are 
under pressure from migrants suggests that apparent competition for 
state rather than private-provided services induces resentment, 
particularly at a time of government austerity. In addition, the terrorist 
violence in 2005 and since, committed largely by UK-based and raised 
young people, provoked demands from David Cameron and his ministers 
for adherence to ‘British values’, which were held to consist of cultural 
and political traditions such as tolerance, democracy and the rule of law 
(Hickman et al. 2012:2; Sturgis et al., 2014: 1287). The link between 
political violence and cultural diversity may be spurious, but it has 
become entrenched in media and popular consciousness. 
 
Conclusion 
Sunderland therefore, despite its strong sense of uniqueness and 
distinctiveness, shares many attitudes with other areas in England. The 
senses of a lost history, of secure jobs and skilled industries that were 
allowed to die by an indifferent government, and of a present that is 
uncertain and subject to external control, combined to produce a strong 
and resentful vote against the EU. It was because Sunderland was the 
first to declare for ‘Brexit’ that it attracted attention, even though the 
‘leave’ vote was higher elsewhere in the North East. At the end of 2016 
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the Sunderland Echo repeated its local poll that had, in May, accurately 
predicted the Referendum result. On this occasion, though, the poll of 
more than 3,000 respondents produced a majority for Remain. It is 
possible that many, faced with the uncertainties of the Brexit process, are 
rethinking their original decisions (Allison, 2016). The superficial certainty 
of the Referendum may have resulted in more doubts and volatility.  
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Voting Data 
Sunderland 2015 voting data – Sunderland City Council, 
http://www.sunderland.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=3435 accessed 
15/10/16 
2016 Referendum results - http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-
information-by-subject/elections-and-Referendums/past-elections-and-
Referendums/eu-Referendum/electorate-and-count-information  
   
Polling Surveys: 
Lord Ashcroft, ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why’, 
24 June 2016, http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-
kingdom-voted-and-why/ accessed 16 October 2016 
‘How Britain Voted’, YOUGOV  = 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ accessed 16 
October 2016 
 
Census 2011: Sunderland Social and Economic Data: 
2011 Census summaries by district – to be found at 
http://www.sunderland.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=8511 accessed 
17/10/16 
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